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BOOK REVIEW
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY AND
FOREIGN INVESTMENT. By Ibrahim F. I. Shihata.t Dor-
drecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, Pp. 540.
$152.00.
Reviewed By T. Modibo Ocran*
The establishment of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA) in Washington, D.C., in April 1988 makes the publi-
cation of this book very timely. Equally important, however, the
book was written by one of the leading insiders in the evolution and
drafting of the substantive agreements and regulations relating to
the organization of MIGA. Since 1983 Dr. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata and
the legal staff of the World Bank have worked feverishly on the es-
tablishment of this agency. This book, which is a product of that
endeavor, is rich in detail and analysis; a remarkable achievement
considering MIGA has just become operational.
The author traces the evolution of MIGA in the context of en-
couraging foreign investment in developing countries. He discusses
the relative merits and demerits of various sources of international
capital movement such as debt and equity and concludes that for
most developing countries the risks associated with debt make it a
less attractive alternative than equity investment. Commercial lend-
ing creates liabilities for the borrower country that are not necessar-
ily related to the contribution of those loans to its debt-servicing
capacity; whereas equity investment establishes a claim to repayment
only to the extent that it yields returns. If equity investment is the
more prudent way out of the dearth of capital in the developing
countries, the creation of the appropriate investment climate logi-
cally becomes a critical issue. Unless the climate is right, the rate and
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types of investments needed by the developing countries are
unachievable.
Dr. Shihata recognizes the importance of this topic and in-
sightfully discusses the creation of the appropriate investment cli-
mate. He emphasizes that while the concept has many interrelated
aspects, these components can be classified into three categories: in-
stitutional, including its policy aspects; infrastructural; and legal. All
of these aspects have their national as well as international dimen-
sions. National action alone, however, cannot create the appropriate
investment climate; rather it must be buttressed and supplemented
by appropriate international policies and institutions. At the core of
the creation of this climate are institutions aimed at the protection
and promotion of foreign investment.
Not only are positive programs needed to promote foreign in-
vestment from the developed to the developing countries and be-
tween the developing countries themselves, but institutions that
regulate foreign investment in a manner that contributes to the de-
velopment of the capital-importing countries are also necessary.
Nevertheless, unless foreign investment is promoted and foreign in-
vestors decide to establish themselves in the developing countries,
there will be nothing to regulate. A question of priorities is raised
here. The original emphasis on the regulation of foreign investment is
shifting to the promotion of foreign investment because the latter
functions as a condition precedent to the exercise of the former.
The organization of MIGA is one effort to create the appropriate in-
ternational investment climate.
MIGA's basic concept is the creation of investment guarantee
schemes in which foreign investors purchase insurance against non-
business or noncommercial risks. Insurance is purchased against
risks associated with the political environment and the economy as a
whole as distinct from traditional business risks. Generally, foreign
investors are most vulnerable to noncommercial risks and need spe-
cial protection in that area. Parties exposed to business risks usually
have ample time to determine the risks involved and procure insur-
ance against those risks through the insurance industry.
Insurance, or guarantee schemes should be analyzed against the
backdrop of related arrangements, such as bilateral and multilateral
investment protection treaties which contain the substantive recipro-
cal assurances between contracting states as to the treatment of for-
eign investments within their borders. Also relevant are the national
constitutions and foreign investment codes of the capital-importing
countries. The existence of these substantive norms on treatment,
however, does not in itself satisfy the concerns of investors. Despite
these arrangements, certain host countries have exercised adverse
measures against foreign investors. This has led to the introduction
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of guarantee schemes, which seek to indemnify the injured investor
irrespective of the presence of an investment protection treaty. The
substantive rules on investment protection and promotion are recip-
rocally connected to the schemes of investment insurance. The sub-
stantive investment protection provisions define the incidents of
injury while the insurance schemes provide the mechanism for in-
demnification of those injured in terms of the appropriate substan-
tive law.
Four categories of such noncommercial risks have been defined
and covered under the MIGA convention. The first risks are associ-
ated with currency transfers resulting from host government restric-
tions and currency conversion and transfer, as distinct from the
devaluation risk. Second are expropriation risks, or risks of loss re-
sulting from legislative or administrative action of the host govern-
ment that deprives the investor of his ownership, control, or
substantial benefit from his investment. The third group are risks
resulting from the repudiation of a contract by the host government
when the investor has no access to a competent forum, faces unrea-
sonable delays, or is unable to enforce the final judgment. Finally,
there are war and civil disturbance risks.
Of course, investment guarantee schemes can be national or in-
ternational in their institutional dimensions. Dr. Shihata explains
the drawbacks of the current national investment schemes to empha-
size the need for an international one. For example, he points out
that the investment coverage of the national agencies, which attempt
to protect investors, fluctuates markedly from year to year and is ex-
tended only to a small fraction of the investment flows. In contrast, a
multilateral agency could provide more diversified protection by ag-
gregating investments from many countries, offering uniform protec-
tion regardless of nationality, and providing coverage to
multilaterally financed investments. Consequently, a multilateral in-
vestment agency would complement the work of the various national
agencies presently operating such as the U.S. Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporation (OPIC) and the Canadian Export Develop-
ment Corporation.
After outlining the concept and rationale of an international
guarantee agency, Dr. Shihata describes the evolution and establish-
ment of such an agency, MIGA. He discusses the early initiatives to
create an international investment guarantee facility in the 1950s and
the resurfacing of the idea in the early 1960s in various international
fora, including the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank,
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the
European Economic Community. Among the efforts of the World
Bank itself, earlier drafts refer to a multilateral investment guarantee
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agency drawn up in 1966, 1968, and 1972. Nothing concrete, how-
ever, emerged out of these proposals. The only international invest-
ment guarantee agency successfully established before MIGA was
the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Agency, a regional institution
established by the Arab countries and limited to investments made
by Arabs in Arab member countries.
The 1981 assumption by Mr. A. W. Clausen to the office of
World Bank President saw the resurgence of the Bank's interest in a
multilateral guarantee agency. A number of studies prepared in
early 1983 laid the foundation for the drafting of a convention for
such an agency. These papers and drafts, prepared by the World
Bank staff, slowly cleared the way for the successful developments
that followed in mid-1983.
The history of MIGA, from the making of the first drafts to the
final adoption of the Convention that established the institution, was
not smooth. Dr. Shihata points out some typical objections made by
the developed and the developing countries during the formation
process. The developed countries, motivated by their perceived na-
tional interests, initially preferred to continue with or establish their
own national programs for political risk insurance. Some of these
countries apparently feared the competition from an international
agency. Some developing countries, on the other hand, feared that
the Agency's guarantees would deprive them of their privileged posi-
tion as the hosts of foreign governments or take away some aspect of
their national legislative discretion, which they would retain if no in-
ternational commitments existed as to the treatment of foreign
investments.
Given this antagonistic background, the World Bank mounted
intensive efforts to create an awareness both inside and outside the
Bank of MIGA's uniqueness and importance and to build up the sup-
port required to assure positive outcomes at subsequent meetings of
the Bank's Executive Directors. Dr. Shihata gives a personal account
of the steps that were taken to assure these outcomes. The Executive
Directors of the Bank, at their meeting on September 12, 1985, ap-
proved the draft convention and the related documents and trans-
mitted them to the Board of Governors, who gave their approval at
their annual meeting in Seoul in October 1985. The Bank's Board of
Governors opened the Convention establishing MIGA for signature
on October 11, 1985. The Convention, however, did not become
effective until April 12, 1988, because it had to be ratified by nine
industrial countries and twenty developing countries whose sub-
scriptions amounted to 578 million dollars of authorized capital. On
June 8, 1988, Mr. Barber B. Conable, the current President of the
World Bank, held an inaugural meeting of MIGA's governing coun-
cil in Washington to adopt bylaws, elect members of the Board of
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Directors, and adopt terms and conditions for future members. As a
result, MIGA became operational as the first truly global multilateral
investment guarantee agency.
Parts 2 and 3 of the book, which constitute the majority of the
material, deal with the operations of MIGA and underlying policy
and institutional concerns.' The MIGA Convention contains several
elements that are common to treaties dealing with investment insur-
ance. Included among such provisions are:
(1) sections requiring approval of the investment projects by
the participating governments and parties;
(2) limits on the types of insured investments, and standards of
professional and administrative treatment to be accorded the
investments;
(3) methods of valuation and compensation in the event of
expropriation;
(4) recourse provisions defining the forum for dispute settle-
ment and provisions regarding consultation upon request of either
party; and
(5) limits on the scope of protection, and explanations of subro-
gation procedures. These issues are dealt with in Part 2 of the book.2
The first step in analyzing an investment insurance scheme is the
determination of eligible investors. To qualify for MIGA guarantees
an investor must be a national of a member country or, in the case of
a corporate investor, either be incorporated and have its principal
place of business in the member country or have the majority of its
capital owned by nationals of member countries. One distinguishing
element of MIGA is that insurance eligibility can cover not only na-
tionals of capital-exporting countries, but also nationals of the host
state if they transfer back assets to be invested. Dr. Shihata points
out that this provision is intended to assist member countries in at-
tracting flight capital3 back to their own countries.
Among the relevant provisions of the investment insurance
scheme are sections requiring agreement on the nature of the pro-
ject or investment being insured. Investment eligibility requirements
I Notably, the book was published before MIGA became operational. The discus-
sion, therefore, is based entirely on the Convention, draft bylaws, and regulations to which
the author had access as an insider.
2 At the end of Part 2, Dr. Shihata also draws attention to some other nonguarantee
operations that MIGA is expected to carry out. These include consultative and advisory
services such as performing relevant research, disseminating information to investors and
host countries, providing technical assistance and policy advice to improve investment
conditions, seeking to remove barriers facing the movement of capital and technology
across national boundaries, assisting in the amicable settlement of disputes, and facilitat-
ing agreements on the treatment of foreign investments.
3 This is the transfer of capital to avoid a risk of financial loss. Often the risk in-
volved is the result of an unstable currency, and the capital transfer is to a more stable
currency.
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under MIGA will initially include equity investments and equity-type
loans. Equity-type loans are loans and loan agreements held by eq-
uity holders in the investment project with maturities of three or
more years. Unlike most bilateral schemes, however, MIGA will also
extend coverage to nonequity forms of direct investment. These in-
clude contractual agreements falling between traditional investments
and export credits such as production sharing, profit sharing, man-
agement, and turnkey contracts, as well as franchising, licensing, and
operating lease agreements. MIGA's Board of Directors is also au-
thorized to extend coverage to additional forms of direct investment.
Assuming that the investors and the investments themselves are
eligible for protection under the Convention, the next step is to eval-
uate the scope of coverage or protection. Under the MIGA Conven-
tion the covered risks, as previously mentioned, include currency
transfer risks, expropriation risks, loss of forum risks, and war and
civil disturbance risks. In the future, coverage may be extended to
other noncommercial risks such as acts of terrorists directed at the
investors, kidnappings, or politically motivated strikes.
Of all the provisions included in investment insurance agree-
ments, those defining the rights of the insuring agency against the
host state are the most critical. Here the notion of subrogation is
cardinal. Essentially, subrogation constitutes the assignment of an
existing claim from the investor to the insurance agency. In practical
terms, the agency makes payment to an investor under the guarantee
agreement in connection with an injury in a member state, and the
host state recognizes the transfer by the investor to the insurance
agency of any currency, credits, assets, or investments for which pay-
ment was made under the coverage. The host state must also recog-
nize the subrogation of the insurance agency to any related right,
title, claim, privilege, or cause of action that the investor may have
against the host state.
The MIGA Convention affirms the subrogation principle. Upon
payment of a claim to the investor, MIGA becomes subrogated to the
investor's rights against the host country or third-party obligors. Be-
cause the insured investors will not be parties to the Convention,
subrogation will be based on covenants in the guarantee contracts
between MIGA and the investors. Article 18(B) of the Convention
requires the host country and all other member countries to recog-
nize MIGA's subrogation without the need for any further
agreement.
With respect to underwriting requirements, MIGA will offer in-
vestors a choice between coverage against individual risks or package
coverage comprised of protection for several or all of the risks. In
contrast, most national investment guarantee agencies offer just one
package coverage, normally at a flat rate. Under the MIGA provi-
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sions, premiums payable for insurance will be differentiated in ac-
cordance with actual risk-taking within a range of 0.3 to 0.5 percent
of the guaranteed amount per annum for each type of risk covered.
Within this range risks will be rated on a case-by-case basis rather
than on the economic and political stability of the host country. In-
vestors purchasing coverage against several types of risks will qualify
for a discount of up to fifty percent of the coverage rates that com-
prise the package.
Part 3 of the book deals with the general policy and institutional
issues that are raised within the context of the projected operations
of MIGA. One of the basic issues raised by Shihata, which is also of
interest in general international law, is the question of the applicable
standards for determining the presence or absence of injury to a for-
eign investor and thereby triggering the guarantee obligations under
the MIGA agreements. As previously indicated, even though insur-
ance or guarantee agreements ensure the subrogation of the inves-
tor's rights to the insurance agency, these agreements themselves do
not spell out those rights of the investor constituting the subject mat-
ter of the subrogation. Rather, these rights are dealt with elsewhere
in bilateral investment protection treaties, multilateral conventions,
general principles of international law, the national investment
codes, investment-related legislation, and the constitutions of host
states. What the MIGA Convention perceives as the appropriate
standards for treatment is, therefore, a relevant inquiry.
The provisions of the MIGA Convention do not include a list of
the substantive and procedural standards that should apply to invest-
ments made in the territories of other parties. This does not mean
that the Convention belittles the importance of available standards.
Indeed, the Convention requires the Agency to satisfy itself that fair
and stable standards exist before launching guarantee operations in
a given country. As Dr. Shihata explains, however, the Convention
refrained from creating standards or obligations on members be-
cause of the variations in prevailing standards and to avoid conflicts
with member states' constitutional or legislative requirements.
MIGA seeks to maintain a careful balance between the respective
rights of the host country, the investors, and the Agency itself. Its
regulations assume that the legal protection accorded to foreign in-
vestments will be adequate for the Agency's purpose when an appli-
cable agreement exists between the investor-state and the host
country. Thus, whatever identifiable standards requirement exists in
the MIGA Convention should be interpreted in the light of Article 2,
which speaks of the encouragement of investment flows among its
members.
Dr. Shihata discusses six types of disputes in which the Agency
would be either directly involved or in which it would have a clear
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interest even though it was not a party to that dispute. These
include:
(1) disputes between the Agency and a member state regarding
the interpretation or application of the MIGA Convention;
(2) disputes concerning claims of the Agency against the gov-
ernment of a host country where the Agency acts as a subrogee of an
investor whom the Agency has paid or agreed to pay compensation
under a contract of guarantee;
(3) disputes between the Agency and a member other than
those disputes already mentioned above, as well as disputes between
the Agency and a state which has ceased to be a member;
(4) disputes between the Agency and a holder of a guarantee or
reinsurance policy issued by it;
(5) disputes between the Agency and other third parties based
on contractual or tort liability; and
(6) disputes between a holder of the Agency's guarantee and
the government of the host country.
Dr. Shihata then discusses at length the methods of dispute set-
tlement when the Agency becomes a party. Disputes with members
over the interpretation or application of the Convention's provisions
are to be settled by the Agency's Board, subject to possible appeal by
the member concerned to the Agency's Council of Governors.
Other disputes between the Agency and its members, and all of the
Agency's disputes with a state that has ceased to be a member will be
settled in accordance with the procedures detailed in Annex 2 to the
Convention. 4 Disputes between the Agency and a holder of its guar-
antee or a beneficiary of its reinsurance would be settled by arbitra-
tion, which can be conducted in accordance with modified
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
arbitration rules unless the parties agree otherwise. When the
Agency is subrogated to an investor and, as a result, becomes a party
to disputes with the host country, such disputes will be settled ac-
cording to the procedures mentioned in Annex 2 to the Convention
unless an alternative method has been agreed upon beforehand be-
tween the Agency and that country. Creditors other than members
of the Agency, guaranteed investors, and claimants deriving their
claims from members can still sue the Agency before domestic courts
that have jurisdiction pursuant to either their respective law or ex-
plicit provisions in an agreement with the Agency. Such agreements
also may specify other methods of resolution such as arbitration.
Finally, Dr. Shihata discusses the organizational and voting
structure of MIGA. Article 30 of the Convention denotes MIGA's
4 This Annex envisages negotiations, possibly conciliation, and, failing a solution of
the dispute, compulsory arbitration.
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three organs: The Council of Governors, the Board of Directors,
and the President and staff. This structure differs from the one cre-
ated by the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (IBRD) or the World Bank. While a
great similarity exists between the constitutive provisions of the
World Bank and MIGA, the Agency is not a carbon copy of a "Bret-
ton Woods" institutional model such as the World Bank. The most
important difference is the requirement of the MIGA Convention
that, after an initial period, parity in the voting power should be es-
tablished between the two categories of member countries, which are
divided into developed and developing countries, or capital export-
ing and capital importing countries.
The author discusses at length the unique voting structure fi-
nally negotiated under the MIGA Convention. He gives an interest-
ing conceptual description of the various types of voting options
available to international development institutions. He speaks of the
Bretton Woods Institutions pattern, first adopted in the Articles of
Agreement of the IBRD and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
as well as "the voting blocks pattern," which is typical of the interna-
tional commodity organizations. In the former pattern a certain
number of votes are distributed equally among members while the
rest are allocated according to the number of shares held by each
member. The result is that the wealthier countries have more say in
the decision-making process of the organization. In the voting
blocks pattern, members are divided into two or more categories
with a certain portion of the total votes allotted to each category.
While in most cases each block will have an equal number of votes,
the votes allotted to each member within the block differs according
to its financial contribution or its interest in, or utilization of, the
institution. In both patterns weighted voting is mitigated or empha-
sized by requirements related to the quorum for meetings and to
special majorities for passing certain resolutions. Probably because
the author is concerned primarily with financial institutions, he does
not mention the third pattern of international voting adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly and its various organs. This con-
sists of one country, one vote, which of course is the most demo-
cratic form of voting. Dr. Shihata mentions the conflict between two
important objectives of the Convention in relation to the selection of
the appropriate voting pattern. These are voting parity between the
two categories of members and allowing each member to preserve its
relative share in the Agency's capital on the occasion of each capital
increase.
The voting structure eventually agreed upon was a formula by
which there would be equal voting power between capital-exporting
countries and capital-importing countries when all World Bank
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members have joined MIGA. Each member country would then re-
ceive 177 membership votes and one additional vote per share sub-
scribed. In MIGA's first three years, each of the two groups of
countries is assured a minimum of forty percent of the total voting
power by the allocation of supplementary votes if necessary. All de-
cisions during this initial period will require a special majority of at
least two-thirds of the total voting power, representing fifty-five per-
cent of the subscribed shares of MIGA's capital stock. While the sup-
plementary votes and the special majority requirement will be
canceled at the end of the three year period, unsubscribed shares will
then be reallocated to achieve voting parity of the two groups of
countries on the basis of membership vote and subscription votes.
As to the operational structure of the organization, the author
notes other differences between the Bretton Woods-type institutions
and MIGA. For example, the respective powers of the Board and the
President are different in the two types of institutions, and MIGA's
Board, unlike the Boards of IBRD and IMF, will not function in con-
tinuous session except at such future time as the need arises.
Although the Convention is silent on the question of the internal
organizational structure of the Agency, and the MIGA regulations
provide few details, MIGA will likely have a Guarantee Department,
a Technical and Advisory Services Department (both corresponding
to the two main operational activities of the Agency), as well as a
Legal Department, which would serve the other two departments.
Dr. Shihata's book concludes with some very useful appendices,
including the Convention establishing MIGA, commentary on the
Convention, discussion papers preceding the establishment of the
Convention, ahd the draft rules and regulations of the Agency.
These papers, in addition to the main body of the book, constitute a
wealth of information for the researcher who is interested not only in
the specific institutional history of MIGA, but also in investment
guarantee schemes as part of the overall institutional mix for the
protection and promotion of foreign investment. This level of detail,
however, may prove unnecessarily extensive even to a specialist in
the field.
One excellent feature of this volume is the author's efforts to
place the details concerning the institution's history in perspective.
For example, the introductory chapter places the entire text in the
general framework of public international law and international busi-
ness transactions, and helps mitigate the essentially historical ac-
count that follows in Part 1 of the book. Similarly, Chapter 6 of Part
3, entitled "MIGA and the Standards Applicable to Foreign Invest-
ments," places in perspective some of the broad ranging interna-
tional law issues concerning the proper treatment of alien property.
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This holds the reader's attention through the descriptive account of
the Agency's organization and voting structure.
Although the book's primary place in the literature on foreign
investment is as a reference on MIGA, it provides important com-
mentary on larger issues such as the notion of an investment climate,
the general role of foreign investment in the developmental process,
and the links between investment protection treaties and investment
guarantee agreements as mutually supporting institutions. Dr.
Shihata has increased his stature as an international law scholar and
diplomat by the publication of this book. The basic advantage of hav-
ing an insider write on a topic of this sort is in the credibility of the
source and the probable reduction of factual errors and second
guessing. Nevertheless, a possible drawback is that the insiders may
be too optimistic about the historic role of the institution and too
convinced as to the wisdom of particular institutional choices they
made in the course of their duties.
Clearly, beyond its technical job of investment insurance and
consultative and advisory services, MIGA could serve an even more
important function that cannot be addressed adequately by bilateral
investment agreements and schemes. MIGA could create a broader
forum for international policy cooperation on investments among
capital-exporting countries, capital-importing countries, and foreign
investors. Moreover, by treating the issues of international invest-
ment insurance and attendant dispute settlement on the multilateral
plane, one hopes MIGA will act as a buffer against state diplomatic
intervention and thus lessen bilateral confrontation in the invest-
ment dispute settlement area. Whether this arrangement will also
lead to significant depolitization of investment disputes, as has been
claimed, or to a mere multilateralization of the politics of investment
disputes is not yet known.
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